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Previous studies have confirmed that production forecasts in the oil and gas 
industry are exposed to a variety of biases. This thesis extends those previous findings by 
investigating the quality of production forecasts for oil fields on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, which were approved between 1995 and 2017. The research focuses on optimism 
and overconfidence biases.  
Both biases are observable in the production forecasts provided by the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate. By comparing annual production data with production forecasts, it 
is possible to draw conclusions pertaining to the quality of those forecasts. A variety of 
methods are applied to investigate and illustrate the magnitude of those biases. The findings 
illustrate that the reason operators do not attain set project goals is because of 
aforementioned biases rather than unexpected events. The systemic inability to deliver on 
what was promised is observable through the lack of forecasting quality improvement over 
time.  
 vi 
Two correction processes are proposed to reduce the encountered biases. A 
reference class is established to put past outcomes in a distributional setting. Uplift and 
scaling factors are drawn from the class to adjust the biased production forecasts. The 
results show a clear improvement in the quality of production forecasts through the use of 
reference class forecasting. A second process is introduced in which a Bayesian framework 
is suggested to calculate updated production forecasts. The same reference class is used to 
provide a prior distribution, which is then updated by the initial forecast (signal) to 
determine a posterior distribution. The posterior distribution exhibts on average a greater 
variance and a lower mean than the initial forecast. Therefore, the updated production 
forecasts are better calibrated and the impact of the biases is reduced.  
Limitations arise regarding the availability of additional data, however preliminary 
results from the analyses are encouraging. Drawing on past experience to debias production 
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OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION  
Oil and gas projects are typically characterized by their capital intensity as well as 
their longevity. Knowing how much and when hydrocarbons will be produced is important 
as it provides the basis for any cash flow calculations. Hence, an integral part of the Final 
Investment Decision (FID) for any oil and gas project is the production forecast. The 
production forecast should be the result of a mindful assessment of the surface and 
subsurface conditions - i.e. reservoir properties, geological factors, well completion 
constraints etc. 
Oil and gas companies are usually interested in three values obtained from such a 
production forecast. The three values are a low estimate, a mean assessment (or a P50) and 
a high estimate. Uncertainty ranges in the oil and gas industry are typically given by a low 
value and a high value. In this study the definitions set forth by the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate will be utilized, which specify the uncertainty ranges as follows: The low 
estimate is represented by the P10 value, and the high estimate by the P90 value. For a 
continuous distribution, the P10 value marks the point for which 10% of the observations 
will be lower than the P10. The P90 value marks the point for which 90% of the 
observations will be lower than the P90. The quality of those production forecasts will be 
the subject of this study.  
The industry is plagued by frequent schedule delays and cost overruns.1 Observed 
time and cost results tend to deviate from forecasts systemically in one direction, indicating 
 
1 (Welsh et al. 2005), (Ernst & Young 2014),  
 2 
the presence of biases. Those deficiencies are also observable in other uncertainty 
assessments of oil and gas projects, such as production forecasts.2  
 Various research groups have found substantial shortcomings in the petroleum 
industry’s ability to produce unbiased probabilistic forecasts.3 It was observed that the 
forecasts are optimistic in terms of expected production and overconfident regarding the 
range of possible outcomes. There are many reasons why production forecasts consistently 
miss their estimates, which we will elaborate on in one of the subsequent chapters. Given 
the pivotal role of future production values, it is consequential to suggest the need to revise 
those forecasts and highlight the shortcomings with hopes that the industry will adapt and 
improve.   
 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives for this research thesis are threefold. Chapter 2 briefly discusses 
previous research on biases in infrastructure projects. Chapters 3 and 4 introduce the data 
set and applied methodology used in this thesis. The first objective is to investigate whether 
the shortcomings in probabilistic production forecasts found by other research groups still 
persist today. Therefore, chapter 5 analyzes and assesses production forecasts and actual 
production data from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) pertaining the quality of the 
production forecasts. Extending the analysis beyond the base case comparison and having 
access to low and high production estimates allow for an exhaustive study about the quality 
of probabilistic forecasts. The second objective is to analyze and illustrate any biases found. 
Chapter 6 introduces previously suggested processes to reduce encountered biases. The last 
 
2 (Mohus 2018) 
3 (Welsh et al. 2005), (Nandurdikar and Wallace 2011), (Flyvbjerg et al. 2014) 
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objective is to propose methods on how to improve probabilistic production forecasting in 
the oil and gas industry. Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate two different approaches on how to 
debias forecasts.    
 4 
2. Literature review  
SHORTCOMINGS IN LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Large, capital-intensive projects are prone to cost and time overruns. The examples 
are abundant, and the incurred value loss can be substantial.4 A study by Flyvbjerg and 
COWI highlighted significant deviations between forecasts and outcomes for large 
infrastructure projects.5 The study concluded that nine out of ten infrastructure projects 
have experienced cost overruns to varying extent. Cost escalation was observed in different 
industry sectors including roads, rail, energy and others.6 Infamous instances of project 
disasters are found across industries and countries with no immediate improvement over 
time.7 For example: The Sydney Opera House was completed ten years behind schedule. 
The scaled-down version was over-budget by $95 million, against an original estimate of 
$7 million.8 The Channel tunnel, connecting France and the United Kingdom, was over-
budget by 80% and forecasted revenues were halved upon completion.9  
There are many reasons why forecasted project goals were delayed or not attained 
at all. However, the research in this thesis will focus on biases, rather than computational 
errors. Flyvbjerg et al. ascribe the causes for those shortcomings to two predominant 
categories of biases.10 They differentiate between delusional and deceptive biases, both of 
which will be discussed in chapter 5.11  
 
4 (Priemus et al. 2008), (Cantarelli et al. 2012) 
5 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004) 
6 (Buhl et al. 2003) 
7 (Buhl et al. 2002), (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005) 
8 (Flyvbjerg 2014) 
9 (Moore 2010) 
10 (Flyvbjerg 1996), (Buhl et al. 2002) 
11 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2014) 
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There is strong evidence that those shortcomings are not confined to the public 
sector. Projects in the private sector are similarly exposed to cost and time overruns.12  
The upstream oil and gas sector is a project-based industry, where individual 
projects typically compete against each other for internal funding. Those circumstances 
make the oil and gas industry an ideal environment for a variety of biases to occur.  
 
BIASES IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 
The petroleum industry’s susceptibility to biases has been the focus of several 
research groups.13 A seemingly counterintuitive finding predicates that even experts which 
specialized knowledge exhibit a susceptibility towards biases.14 Industry experience alone 
offers limited help in avoiding these biases. Welsh et al. published a research paper in 2005, 
in which the potential of reducing biases is highlighted if a person undergoes risk training, 
which will be elaborated on in chapter 6.15 
The financial impact of such biases can be substantial. Findings by Welsh et al. in 
2007, indicate that biased input parameters provide erroneous uncertainty distributions not 
only for those input parameters, but also for the resulting outputs.16 The net present value 
(NPV) is a commonly used financial metric in the oil and gas industry. Like other key 
performance indicators, NPV is determined using a variety of inputs, which are uncertain. 
Welsh et al. demonstrate that the NPV calculated from biased input parameters is lower, 
compared to the NPV calculated from unbiased input parameters. In one of the illustrated 
examples the technical reserves were estimated at 360 million barrels of oil, with an 
 
12 (Ernst & Young 2014) 
13 (Hawkins et al. 2002), (Welsh et al. 2005), (Welsh et al. 2007) 
14 (Welsh et al. 2005) 
15 Ibid. 
16 (Welsh et al. 2007) 
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expected value of 346 million USD for the project. Figure 1 shows the impact 
overconfidence levels can have on the project NPV. A probability distribution is said to be 
overconfident if the range of distributed values is too small. In Figure 1, the technical 
reserves remain constant at 360 million barrels with varying degrees of overconfidence 
(the actual reserves are a function of economics and would therefore change).  
While real-life examples may exhibit different responses to overconfidence levels, 
the discussed case demonstrates the possibility of value erosion. In some instances, it could 
potentially lead to the approval of a project which - if the input parameters were unbiased 
- would have yielded a negative NPV. 
 
 
Figure 1. NPV change with varying degree of overconfidence 
(Welsh et al. 2007)  
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Welsh et al. focused on the effect of the overconfidence bias, the trust heuristic bias, 
and the availability bias. However, subsequent research has confirmed that the industry 
seems to be affected by an even broader range of biases.17 
The financial ramifications of different biases vary depending on the type of bias 
encountered. A study by Mohus in 2018 examined 56 oil fields regarding lost value due to 
cost and time overruns as well as underproduction.18 The accrued value erosion due to 
biased production forecasts was estimated at 56.8 billion USD for those fields. While the 
impact of overconfidence production forecasts appears to be substantial, other biases in the 
oil and gas industry seem to be less damaging. In 2008, Begg and Bratvold published the 
results of a study that investigated the errors associated with project and portfolio selection. 
They concluded that the impact of the selection bias, relative to other biases in the oil and 
gas industry, seems comparatively small.19 It is worth mentioning, that the selection bias 
is potentially more severe if the initial NPV estimates carry more uncertainty, which would 




17 (Welsh and Begg 2015), (Mohus, 2018) 
18 (Mohus, 2018) 
19 (Begg and Bratvold 2008) 
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3. Data 
ATTRIBUTES OF PROBABILISTIC FORECASTS  
Future production is unknown and, therefore their forecasts are associated with 
varying degrees of uncertainty. Best practice stipulates that probabilistic forecasts are 
generated to assess the uncertainties. There are several characteristics of probabilistic 
production forecasts that are of interest to this study. A set of criteria must be met to 
consider a probability distribution as well-calibrated. A well-calibrated production forecast 
is unbiased and consistent with the forecasters’ knowledge.  
First, the lower (P10) and upper (P90) percentiles must be calculated, so that 80% 
of the time, the actual production outcomes fall within the range set by the two values. If 
this is not the case, the confidence interval is either too narrow or too wide, the former 
being more common in the production forecasting context and is denoted as 
overconfidence.20  
The forecasted P50 of a well-calibrated probability distribution specifies the value 
at which 50% of the actual outcomes exceed the P50 and half of the actual outcomes fall 
short of the P50. If more than half the actual values are greater or smaller than the P50, the 
probability distribution is either optimistic or pessimistic. An illustration of a biased 





20 (Welsh et al. 2005) 
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DATA PRE-TREATMENT 
The data set utilized for the analysis in this research project comprises of production 
forecasts for 56 oil fields, located on the NCS. The production forecasts consist of a P10, 
a mean and a P90 estimate (rather than a continuous distribution) for every production year 
for every field. The forecasts were made before the time of the FID. Those fields reached 
their FID and were approved between 1995 and 2017. The production data for any fields 
on the NCS is publicly available through the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s (NPD) 
website.21 However, the production forecasts for those fields are not publicly accessible 
and therefore they were provided exclusively for research purposes under the condition 
that they are made anonymous.  
 
21 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2019) 





The NPD specifies that the operator must report probabilistic values on all 
petroleum resources in a way such that the uncertainties “... shall to the extent possible be 
designated by P10 - P expected - P90.”22 It is plausible to assume that a majority of the 
production forecasts were generated using a base case approach. The base case is calculated 
using inputs and assumptions that are consider most likely to occur. The best estimate is 
defined by the NPD as the “best estimate of petroleum volumes that are expected to be 
recovered from a project” and “If the best estimate is determined by a stochastic method, 
the best estimate shall be considered as the expected value”.23 In some cases P10 and P90 
might have been calculated directly from the base case, i.e. using a multiplier, rather than 
being drawn from a continuous probability distribution. However, for the purpose of this 
study it is assumed that the reported values were determined from continues probability 
distributions and thus can be evaluated using attributes of probabilistic forecasts.  
The forecasts are part of the required documentation for the Plan of Development, 
requested by the NPD. Four values are of interest for the subsequent analysis, namely the 
actual production and the three forecasted values: the P10, mean, and P90. In some 
instances, the P50 rather than the mean will be used. For most fields, the forecasted mean 
is close but not equal to the P50. The implications of the inequality will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. Only some minor adjustments to the data set are necessary, since the data has 
already been used in a previous research project.24  
 
 
22 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2018a),(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2018b) 
23 (Consortium 2016) 
24 (Mohus, 2018) 
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START-UP DELAYS 
Mohus (2018) found that the average initial production delay between intended 
start-up and actual start-up for this data set is 202 days.25 With an estimated mean 
development time of 2 years and 8 months, the time overrun averages at around 20% for 
the study period.26 To avoid confounding the impact of poor production forecasts with the 
impact of time delays, the first actual production year was set equal to the first forecasted 
production year. Table 1 shows the estimates (P10, mean and P90) and the actual 
production for one of the fields on the NCS, using anonymized data.  
 
25 (Mohus 2018) 
26 (Haukaas and Mohus 2016) 
Table 1. Correction for start-up delays for one of the fields on the NCS, using anonymized 
data 
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On the left side the actual production is unchanged, and on the right side the actual 
production is corrected for start-up delays. It can be assumed that the forecaster considered 
the first forecasted production year as the first actual production year. In 2017, the 56 fields 
had a total of 603 forecasted production years. The amended data set (corrected for start-




4. Methodology – Probability distribution fitting 
LOGNORMAL FITTING APPROACH 
A key goal of this study is to assess the quality of production forecasts provided by 
the operators. It is assumed that the operators have provided production estimates as 
suggested by the NPD guidelines, i.e., P10/Mean/P90 values for each year. Production 
forecasts will be investigated for cumulative production years as well as individual 
production years. Cumulative production forecasts shall be denoted as production forecasts 
on an aggregated basis, which consider production values from previous years. Individual 
production forecasts shall be denoted as production forecasts on an individual basis, which 
is the forecast for any specific year of interest. 
The cumulative mean production forecast (𝜇𝑛) of a field for any production year n 







The resulting cumulative mean forecast can be directly compared to the cumulative 
production for that field. However, P10 and P90 forecasts for a given aggregation year 
cannot be added in the same way, as the sum of P10 values differs from the P10 of the 
sum.27  
Therefore, obtaining a field's cumulative forecasted P10 or P90 for any aggregation 
year will require first fitting a distribution to each of that field's yearly forecasts for two 
out of the three forecasted values, namely P10, mean, and P90. There is no single 
continuous distribution that will have an exact fit for all three forecasted values, for every 
 
27 (Kreifeldt and Nah 1995) 
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given input triplet. While there might be instances where the unmatched, third estimate is 
equal to the equivalent value drawn from the fitted distribution, this remains the exception. 
As a consequence, a probability distribution was chosen that honors two out of the three 
forecasted values. A lognormal distribution was selected since it is bounded at zero on the 
low end but also allows to model potential production upside through the tail of the 
distribution on the high end (Figure 3). The two parameters of the lognormal distribution, 
the mean and the standard deviation, can be matched using any combination of two out of 
the three forecasted values – i.e. the P10 and mean, the P90 and mean, or the P10 and P90.   
Figure 3. P10/mean lognormal fit for one field on the NCS 
 
Selecting the P10 and mean as input values for the distribution fitting, rather than 
any of the other two combinations, will allow for more conclusive comparison, as the data 
is skewed towards the lower value (Figure 3). Using the mean as one of the fitting 
parameters seems appropriate as most of the time and effort goes into determining the mean 
forecast. Additionally, operators should pay close attention to downside risk in production 
 15 
forecasts, validating the choice for the P10 as one of the fitting parameters, ensuring an 
exact fit for the P10 production forecast. The steps of the fitting approach are outlined 
below. 
 






(ln (𝑥) − 𝜇)2
2𝜎2
)            𝑥 > 0, 𝜎 > 0 
 
where the logarithm of the random variable 𝑥 is normally distributed 
 
ln (𝑥)~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) 
 
















2. The mean (𝑚) of the non-logarithmized sample (𝑥) – i.e. the forecasted mean 
production, is used to calculate the mean (𝜇) and variance (𝜎2) of the logarithmized sample 








𝐹𝑥(𝑧) =   (




where z is the percentile value (i.e. -1.282 for the P10 and 1.282 for the P90) for percentile 
 of the lognormally distributed production forecast. The mean (𝑚) of the production 
forecast and the cumulative normal distribution function (𝐹𝑥) are expressed in terms of 𝜇: 
 




𝜇 = ln(𝑧) − 𝜎Φ−1(𝛼) . 
 
The two equations for 𝜇 are combined and the resulting equation can be solved using the 
quadratic formula. It will yield either zero, one or two solutions for 𝜎. The (real) solution 
must be chosen, so that 𝜎 is positive and the calculated mean matches the given mean using 
𝜎:  
 
 𝜎2 − 2Φ−1(𝛼)𝜎 + 2[ln(𝑧) − ln(𝑚)] = 0  
   
 
𝜎 =







𝐴 = 1 
 
𝐵 = −2Φ−1(𝛼) 
 
𝐶 = 2[ln(𝑧) − ln(𝑚)] 
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The mean of the normal distribution is calculated using  
 
 𝜇 = ln(𝑚) − 𝜎2 2⁄   
 
With the mean and the standard deviation, it is possible to get an exact fit for the mean and 
the selected percentile and an approximate fit for the remaining percentile. The fitting 
method can also be used with the mean and the P90 value, as well as the P10 and P90 value, 
demonstrated in Appendix A-1. A comparison between different fitting methods is in 
Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Lognormal distribution fit for one field in year 0, using P10 and mean, P90 and 
mean and P10 and P90. 
 
3. Next, the mean and standard deviation of the fitted lognormal distributions now 
enable the summation of the production years for the individual fields, to obtain cumulative 
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production forecasts. Given the assumption that the production forecasts are independent, 
it is possible to calculate the cumulative variance (𝜎𝑛
 2) for aggregation year n by adding 
up the variances of the previous years (𝜎𝑖
 2).  
 
𝜎𝑛






To re-calculate the P10 and P90 of the aggregated production forecasts, values were 
transformed from the input data space (lognormal mean and variance) to the calculation 
space (non-logarithmized mean and variance) using the following two equations, which 
we already used previously to define the normal distribution. 
 







   
 
𝜎2 is the variance of the non-logarithmized input value. 
 





In some cases, the operator failed to provide valid P10 (and/or P90) forecasts. Such 
an invalid forecast would comprise of a P10 (and/or P90) value equal to the mean forecast, 
a P10 (and/or P90) value of zero or the absence of a P10 (and/or P90) value. In such 
instances those fields were omitted from the analysis. The resulting probability 
distributions of the aggregated production forecasts allow the identification of any 
statistics, including the P10, mean, P50 and P90. 
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SKEWNESS OF LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Some of the subsequent analyses use the P50, rather than the mean forecast. For 
most fields in this study, the mean of the forecasted aggregated production is close to the 
P50 of the forecasted aggregated production, yet they are still inequal. To validate the use 
of the P50 instead of the mean, the skewness of the distributions needs to be quantified.  
The input parameters used for the lognormal distribution fitting exhibit positive 
skew, as the ration (𝑃90 − 𝑃50)/(𝑃50 − 𝑃10) > 1. Thus, the lognormal distributions 
also exhibit positive skew with 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 > 𝑃50. Pearson’s second skewness 
coefficient was determined for each field used in the aggregation calculations. Aggregation 
year 4 was used as an example to demonstrate the range of skewness coefficients.  
For aggregation year 4, the resulting skewness coefficients range from 0.04 and 0.8, 
with an average of 0.2. A skewness of 0 indicates a perfectly symmetric distribution. A 
rule of thumb dictates that if skewness is between -1 and -0.5 or between 0.5 and 1, the 
distribution is moderately skewed. If skewness is between -0.5 and 0.5, the distribution is 
approximately symmetric (Bulmer 1979).  
With increasing number of distributions being added, the skewness reduces in 
accordance with the Central Limit Theorem. Positive skewness is expected in the 
production forecasting context as production is bounded on the low end and unbounded on 
the high end. With an average skewness coefficient of 0.2 for aggregation year 4 (reduced 
for subsequent aggregation years), evaluating biases based on P50 values - rather than 
means - appears valid. Despite 𝑃50~mean, the analyses should use the mean values when 
convenient to honor inputs provided by operators. 
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5. Results and Analyses 
No fields from the data set were omitted from any of the analyses unless otherwise 
indicated. Using the method presented in the previous chapter, a series of methods will be 
introduced to illustrate the performance of production forecasts.  
 
FORECASTED PRODUCTION PROFILE VS. ACTUAL PRODUCTION PROFILE 
Figure 5 shows actual production and mean forecasted production for all 55 fields, 
and Figure 6 shows the fields' cumulative production by year. Again, in these graphs time 
delays have been eliminated so that actual production start equals forecasted production 
start for all of the fields.  




Figure 6. Cumulative actual production and cumulative mean forecasted production for all 
fields. The grey bars indicate the number of fields available for the analysis in each 
production year. 
 
Figure 5 shows that for each of the first five years, average actual production from 
the 55 fields was short of average forecasted-mean production. However, from year six 
onward, average actual production was greater than average forecasted-mean production. 
Figure 6 shows that in year 20, cumulative actual production is close to cumulative 
forecasted-mean production. However, as will be discussed in detail later, most of the fields 
delivering on the expected ultimate recovery (or exceeding it) required additional 
investment beyond what was used in the production forecast made at the time of FID. 
Additional investment types included, but is not limited to: redevelopment projects, 
additional wells, etc. The grey bars indicate the number of fields available for the analysis 
for any production year. 
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OPTIMISM BIAS  
Operators are interested in production forecasts on an individual basis, when 
compared to actual production, to judge whether production goals were met. Likewise, the 
comparison between an aggregated production forecast and cumulative production will 
indicate whether an operator has delivered over the life of a field. Biases that are observable 
for both, the aggregated and individual production years, will also render the argument that 
individual production forecast might suffer from one-off unexpected events rather than 
biases, invalid.  
The degree of optimism bias for any aggregated production year n can be assessed 
by using cumulative distributions of the normalized actual production of all fields. 
Comparing the cumulative distribution with the normalized forecasted mean production 
for aggregation year n will also demonstrate the quantitative impact of optimism. The 
generation of the cumulative distributions over normal actual production values was 
preceded by a number of steps.   
 
1. First, the aggregated mean production forecast for year n has been normalized so 
that the mean forecast is 1.0. 
 
2. Next, each field’s actual production outcome for aggregation year n was normalized 
by the field’s mean forecasts, to allow the distribution of forecasted mean production to be 
compared with the distribution of actual production. 
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3. Because the ratio of the forecasted mean production versus actual production varies 
by field, a Metalog distribution28 was fit to the normalized actual production data. The 
Metalog distribution was chosen because it is simple, flexible and provides an easy fit.  
 
Figure 7. CDF for normalized actual production, with the normalized mean forecast 
indicated. The CDF is for the aggregation year 3, including all fieldsFigure 7 displays the 
CDF for aggregation year three (chosen randomly) with the red line indicating the 
normalized mean production forecast. The horizontal axis denotes the aggregated, 
normalized actual production values for the aggregation year, and the vertical axis denotes 
the probability of the actual production being less than the value of the horizontal axis.  
 
 
28 (Keelin, 2019) 
Figure 7. CDF for normalized actual production, with the normalized mean forecast 
indicated. The CDF is for the aggregation year 3, including all fields 
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If the production forecasts were unbiased, the normalized actual production values 
would be less than the normalized mean production forecast approximately 50% of the 
time (recall 𝑃50~mean for aggregation years). Figure 7 shows that for aggregated year 3, 
optimism in the mean forecasts can be observed, as the probability of production being less 
than the normalized mean forecast is greater than 50%. In fact, for 69% of the fields, the 
normalized actual production was less than the normalized mean forecast production 
(x=1.0). 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR OPTIMISM BIAS 
A sensible question to ask at this point is if optimism bias is also observable in other 
aggregation years. Figure 8 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis of the optimism bias 
as a function of production year. The orange dots show the percentage of fields whose 
cumulative actual production did not exceed the field's aggregated forecasted P50, to 
number of aggregation years 𝑛. Notice that for the sensitivity analysis, the P50 (determined 
from the fitted lognormal distribution) was used instead of the mean. Using the P50 allows 
for valid comparison between the number of instances where the cumulative production 
was less than the aggregated P50 and the aggregated P50 value itself.  Sensitivity years 𝑛 
range between 1 and 8, because beyond year 8 fields are much more likely to be subject to 
redevelopment. Those redevelopments would not have been specified in the FID. The gray 
bars show the number of fields included as a function of 𝑛 with the scale on the right-hand 
side of the graph. The number of fields with valid P50 forecasts decreases as 𝑛 increases, 
because of data availability and field life. Figure 8 shows that there are no major 
improvements in the optimism bias throughout the years, as cumulative forecasted P50 
systemically overestimate production. The aggregated forecasted P50 values are 
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consistently above the black dotted line – the line indicating where an unbiased, well-
calibrated P50 would fall.  
 
OVERCONFIDENCE BIAS  
Recall that for a well-calibrated production forecast, the P10 and P90 values should 
bound the range where the actual production values fall 80% of the time. Using a similar 
approach as with the optimism bias, the probability of the normalized actual production 
being less than the normalized P10 forecast is determined (Figure 9). The same CDF plots 
are used to see whether the normalized P10 forecast for aggregation year 3 (chosen 
randomly) for all fields is overconfident. For an unbiased normalized P10 forecast the 
probability of normalized actual production being less than the normalized P10 forecast 
should, of course, be 10%. If the normalized P10 forecast was unbiased and a red, vertical 
Figure 8. Sensitivity analysis of the optimism bias as a function of production year, on an 
aggregated basis 
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line was constructed using the normalized P10 forecast on the horizontal axis, the red, 
vertical line would cross the CDF with a corresponding value on the vertical axis of 0.1.  
 
The dotted red line in Figure 9 indicates that the normalized P10 value for 
aggregation year 3 is overconfident. For 51 % of the fields, the normalized actual 
production was less than the normalized P10 forecast production. 
 
Figure 9. CDF for normalized actual production, with the normalized P10 forecast 
indicated. The CDF is for the aggregation year 3, including all fields. 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR OVERCONFIDENCE BIAS  
Similar to the optimism bias, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate 
whether the overconfidence bias is observable throughout the first eight production years. 
Figure 10 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis of the overconfidence bias as a function 
of production year. The orange dots show the percentage of fields whose cumulative actual 
production did not exceed the field's aggregated forecasted P10, to number of aggregation 
years 𝑛. The gray bars show the number of fields included as a function of 𝑛 with the scale 
on the right side of the graph. The number of fields with valid P10 forecasts decreases as 
𝑛 increases, because of data availability and field life. There are no major improvements 
in the overconfidence bias throughout the years.  
Overconfidence seems to be even more severe than optimism for this specific data 
set. It is reasonable to assume that most of the time and effort goes into determining the 
Figure 10. Sensitivity analysis of the overconfidence bias as a function of production 
year, on an aggregated basis 
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mean production forecasts, resulting in mean assessments that are less affected by biases 
as compared to low (and/or) high estimates. 
Overconfidence is more apparent in P10 estimates, as P90 estimates might not 
capture the full extent of overconfident forecasts – i.e. it is not possible to exceed the P100. 
Therefore, overconfidence and the impact on the 80% interval is better examined using the 
P10 value.  
 
FIELD SIZE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
An argument could be made that field size might play a role in the occurrence of 
biases and that optimism depends of field size. Some might argue that smaller fields, 
compared to larger fields, need to be more optimistic to get them approved, as smaller 
fields might be more marginally economical. If optimism is intentional to get those field 
approved, the bias becomes a motivational bias.  
Figure 11 shows a sensitivity analysis on the field size vs. the occurrence of 
overconfidence and optimism. There seems to be no observable trend that indicates that 
field size plays a role in how well calibrated forecasts are. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS  
There are several limitations of the analysis that will be briefly discussed in this 
chapter. First, production forecasts and rates are reported annually, which makes it 
impossible to determine the month for first oil production, based on the available data. 
Imagine the following scenario: The forecasted start-up for the first year was intended to 
be early in that year (e.g. February or March), a delay might push the start-up out a few 
months but not into a new calendar year. This will create a seemingly overconfident or 
optimistic first year production forecast. Of course, the opposite scenario is also possible. 
Figure 11. Sensitivity analysis on field size vs. occurrence of overconfidence and optimism. 
The bars depict the relative frequency with which the forecasted P50 is equal or 
greater than the actual production (in blue) and the relative frequency with 
which the forecasted P10 is equal or greater than the actual production (in 
orange). The number of fields that fall into each field size category varies 
between 14 and 6 fields. 
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Therefore, to reliably judge the quality of the production forecasts in year 1, further data 
refinement will be necessary.  
Secondly, as the production years increase the data availability decreases. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to draw conclusive findings supported by statistics.  
 
DO FORECASTERS LEARN FROM THEIR MISTAKES? 
The study period covers 22 years in which there have been significant technical 
advances in the industry. A lot of attention and effort has been spent on increasing the 
sophistication of uncertainty models. But the question remains whether those 
improvements have led to a decrease in biases in those forecasts. Figure 12 shows the 
results of a sensitivity analysis on the production performance of all 55 fields over the 22 
years span.  
The FID year is displayed on the horizontal axis, with each blue dot representing 
the production excess or shortfall of the mean forecast relative to the actual production, for 
a field that was approved (FID) in that year. The mean production forecast for the first four 
years of each field was aggregated and measured against the actual production. For the 
years 2015, 2016 and 2017, the first three, two and one year(s) were used respectively. A 
blue dot below the black line (at value zero) indicates production shortfall, and a dot above 
the line indicates production excess. If there are improvements pertaining the quality of 
production forecasts, the moving average of all dots would converge to zero over time. The 
red curve shows a LOESS curve (local polynomial regression) for the entire time span.  
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From year 1996 to 2008 there is gradual change in the LOESS curve from a low 
value of -0.51 to a high of 0.07, indicating a general improvement in the quality of 
production forecasts. After 2008 the trend reverses and in 2017 the local polynomial 
regression reaches a value of -0.51 again. Therefore, operators do not seem to learn and 
improve the quality of their production forecasts over time, even with the advent of more 
sophisticated uncertainty models over the past two and a half decades. The increase in 
application of more sophisticated models does not in and of itself remove bias or improve 
forecasting performance. 
Figure 12. Production excess or shortfall for cumulative first four-year production displayed 
in the year the FID was made for the field. The red LOESS curve is a moving 
polynomial regression 
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REASONS FOR OVERCONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM 
Future production is uncertain, and this uncertainty creates an environment in 
which unforeseen events will occur. However, a distinction must be made between 
unexpected events and biases in production forecasting. In a major study by Flyvbjerg, the 
reasons for shortcomings in forecasts were classified as causes and root causes.29 
Production is associated with a variety of uncertainties, and some of the causes that may 
occur include development time delays, unexpected geological features, reservoir 
complexity, flow constraints etc. While the causes for not attaining the forecasted 
production are numerous, one should expect an improvement over time. In a professional 
setting, the financial ramifications of not delivering on forecasted production would lead 
to efforts to mitigate future production shortfalls. With no immediate improvement in sight, 
the explanations for those shortcomings must be found elsewhere. The focus why forecasts 
systemically fail to deliver must shift to root causes. The latter are those factors that persist 
in the face of statistical analysis. The root causes are that forecasters continuously 
underestimate and, in some cases, even ignore the previously mentioned causes. The 
ignorance or misjudgments of those uncertainties are ultimately manifested in the observed 
biases. Forecasting errors typically fall in two categories. They can either be unintentional 
(i.e. delusion) or intentional (i.e. deception).  
 
Delusion  
Decision makers and forecasters fall victim to what Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
call the planning fallacy.30 This fallacy will manifest itself in forecasters exhibiting a 
delusional optimism when assessing uncertainties. The tendency to create production 
 
29 (Flyvbjerg 2011) 
30 (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
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forecasts based on scenarios of success might be appealing but forecasters will miss the 
potential for mistakes, even if it is unintentional. Those forecasts will create scenarios in 
which operators do not deliver and what was promised and likewise the expected financial 
returns are not attained. Kahneman and Tversky’s initial work was later extended by 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) who argue that the biases occur because decision makers 
often take an inside view when generating those forecasts. Viewing the problem at hand 
form an inside view will result in forecasters focusing on the unique characteristics of the 
project at hand. Several studies have shown, that adopting an outside view can reduce the 
level of delusion in producing uncertainty estimates.31  
 
Deception 
Another explanation, why forecasts exhibit continuous biases, is deception. 
Strategic and deliberate misrepresentation of future production is a common occurrence in 
a project-based industry.32 Forecasters and decision makers will intentionally overestimate 
production to increase the chances that their project will receive the necessary approval 
and the subsequent funding. The deliberate emphasis of advantageous project 
characteristics and the misrepresentation of potential downside risk will make the project 
appear superior than it actually is. This fosters an environment in which biases are likely 
to occur. Financial metrics can also be used to measure the consequences of those biases. 
Value is destroyed, as capital is not allocated in the most efficient way possible.33 Such 
strategic misrepresentations can be countered by enhancing transparency pertaining project 
forecasts within companies. Providing clarity and aligning incentives, in such a way that 
 
31 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2014), (Kahneman and Lovallo 2003) 
32 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2014) 
33 (Ernst & Young 2014) 
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6. Improvements to production forecasting 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS   
Strong evidence has been presented showing that production forecasts of oil fields 
on the NCS do indeed suffer from optimism and overconfidence. The focus should now 
shift towards possible bias mitigation measures. There are several organizational 
improvements proposed in different research works that have been proven to reduce the 
biases and their impacts.  
 
Number of expert opinions 
Welsh et al. (2007) showed that if an increasing number of expert opinions are 
considered, overconfidence decreases with a rate that is dependent on the extend of 
agreement between different experts.34 They found that the decrease in overconfidence 
levels, with the increasing number of expert opinions, is non-linear and tends to reduce as 
the number of experts increases, shown in Figure 13. Thus, more expert opinions only 
translate into marginal overconfidence reductions after a certain threshold.  
 
34 (Welsh et al. 2007) 
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In a corporate setting production forecasts are typically reviewed by more than one 
person but seldomly do those numbers increase into the double digits. Potentially a greater 
impact stems from the fact that in most companies, expert opinions - while sometimes 
reached individually - will be incorporated in such a way that there is generally a consensus 
reached among those who produce or review the production forecasts. The data available 
in this study does not indicate the number of expert judgements used to produce the 
production forecasts.  
 
Figure 13. Reduction of overconfidence levels by number of experts and 
level of agreement 
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Risk awareness training  
In 2005 Welsh and colleagues published the results of a study in which they asked 
oil and gas industry professionals a set of questions to highlight common biases.35 One of 
the biases that was investigated was overconfidence. The results confirmed that 
overconfidence commonly occurs in the oil and gas industry. Participants of the study were 
also asked regarding their industry expertise as well as state their previous experience with 
risk awareness training and when they completed such training. Findings highlighted that 
there is no significant reduction in overconfidence with increasing industry experience – 
which might be most surprising or even worrying, since we commonly rely on industry 
professional with experience. However, the subject individuals who had undergone recent 
risk awareness training were performing slightly better than those whose training has been 
further in the past.  
A subsequent study that was published by the same authors confirmed previous 
findings regarding the reduction of overconfidence with individuals who have had some 
sort of risk training.36 This study made the difference even more apparent as a group of 
students was given two test, one prior to risk awareness training and one immediately after 
the risk awareness training. The results showed an increase in the range estimates by 20% 
for the answers given in the post-training test. The importance of frequent risk awareness 
training was made apparent when the same group of students outperformed a group of 
industry professionals of whom half of those professionals had some sort of risk awareness 
training in the past.   
The extend of the debiasing effect seems to differ not only regarding the timing of 
when risk awareness training has been received, but also on the industry and its ability to 
 
35 (Welsh et al. 2005) 
36 (Welsh et al. 2006) 
 38 
highlight those shortfalls in a practical setting.37 Kahneman has found that the effect of 
debiasing forecasts is mitigated once applied in practice.38 Therefore, there is a need to 




There is clear evidence that tracking past performances will aid in reducing biases 
encountered in uncertainty assessments.39 Fondren et al. published a research study in 2013 
in which a database was built to track probability assessments and their outcomes. In one 
of the examples, shale production forecasts were compared to actual production outcomes 
to assess the biases and investigate possible corrections. The findings show that using past 
results can help better calibrate production forecasts. Figure 15 and Figure 14 summarize 
their findings.  
 
37 (Sellier et al. 2019) 
38 (Kahneman 2011) 
39 (Capen 1976), (Fondren et al. 2013),  
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The plots indicate the percentiles on the horizontal axis and the percentiles based 
on the actual outcomes on the vertical axis. For an unbiased forecast the data points would 
fall on the 45-degree line, i.e. a forecasted Pxx would be an observed Pxx. However, as the 
authors point out, there are limitations to their study. Given the sparse amount of actual 
production history, the future actual production was generated using “hind-casting”. Shale 
formations are characterized by fast build-ups and declines, which limits the number of 
Figure 15. Biased long-term forecast (left) and debiased long-term forecast with 1.5 years 
of production history. (Fondren et al. 2013) 
Figure 14. Biased long-term forecast (left) and debiased long-term forecast with 3 years of 
production history. (Fondren et al. 2013) 
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usable production years. The attention then shifts towards the question whether a few years 
of actual production history are sufficient to measure the full extent of the impact of those 
biases? 
Tracking performance through past production history is beneficial and easy to 
implement, yet organizational measures maybe often be cumbersome to introduce, and 
their adaptability might vary depending on company culture. Therefore, the next two 
chapters will briefly introduce two methods that can be used to reduce biases in production 





7. Reference Class Forecasting  
The previous chapters highlighted the possibility of using past performances and 
actual outcomes to improve uncertainty assessments in probabilistic forecasting. One such 




Reference class forecasting (RCF) is based on early work from Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky who propose the selection of a reference class “… for which the 
distribution of outcomes is known, or can be assessed with reasonable confidence.”40 A 
reference class is a group of comparable, historic projects. To establish an appropriate 
reference class the number of projects included must be large enough to allow for statistical 
conclusions to be drawn. However, it must also capture the characteristics of the project in 
question, such as size, complexity, duration etc., which will in contrast limit the size of the 
class.  
The idea behind reference class forecasting is to provide an outside view on projects 
with the goal to mitigate some of the biases described earlier. The outside view is achieved 
by gathering information regarding outcomes and by establishing a distribution of past 
projects in a statistical setting. This distribution can then be used to improve the specific 
project at hand. Kahneman and Tversky concluded that decision makers and forecasters 
that focus on individual estimates, without considering distributional information, will be 
optimistic in their assessments.41 Various research studies have proven that if a suitable 
 
40 (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
41 Ibid.  
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reference class is applied, the accuracy of the investigated forecasts will improve.42 In one 
such study, Flyvbjerg et al. investigated the performance of time and cost estimates for 
roadwork projects in Hong Kong. Projects were divided in different categories depending 
on what completion stage they were in. Optimistic and overconfident forecasts were 
identified, and a reference class was used to correct the forecasts. The resulting uplift 
factors (U) are a function of the probability (p) of a cost or time overrun. For the 
probabilities between 0 and 1, the maximum overrun was established that was not exceeded 
in the historic data, where 𝑥 are the overruns and 𝑋 is a given value of 𝑥. (𝑖𝑛𝑓 being the 
infimum; the greatest lower bound for this set). The results are illustrated in Figure 16. 
𝑈(𝑝) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑥: 𝑝 ≤ 𝑃𝑟(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥)} 
 
42 (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), (Gilovich et al. 2002), (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004), (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016) 
Figure 16. Uplift factors for different acceptable chance of cost overrun 
for one of the project categories. The grey band indicates 
the 95% confidence interval. Flyvbjerg et al. 2016 
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 The uplift factors to adjust the initial, biased forecasts for all projects are 
summarized in Figure 17. The factors can be used as a multiplication factors for the 
original, biased forecast. For example: an uplift of 13% will yield in a multiplication factor 








43 (Flyvbjerg 2005) 
Figure 17. Uplift multipliers for roadwork project forecasts in HK early stage projects 
(Category C) and late stage projects (Category A); (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016) 
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1.) Past projects that are comparable to the project at hand will be identified and 
included in the reference class. The selection process may vary on the user’s preferences 
and which projects she or he deems comparable.  
 
2.) A cumulative probability distribution for the parameter of interest (usually 
completion time or cost) is generated using outcomes from past projects that were selected 
in step 1. One possible approach would include determining the required probability of 
meeting a production forecast, based on the historic data, and fitting a cumulative 
distribution to the past outcomes.  
 
3.) Finally, the project at hand is compared with the distribution obtained in step 2. The 
comparison will yield uplift and/or scaling factors that can be used to amend the probability 
assessment for the project at hand, as shown in Figure 17. An example will be demonstrated 
in the subsequent paragraphs.  
 
To date, there has not been an extensive, public study on the application of RCF for 
production volumes (or reserves) in conventional oil and gas reservoirs. There might be 
several reasons why this is the case. Oil and gas companies are naturally inclined not to 
disclose sensitive data, making it difficult to gain access to production forecasts. While the 
theory behind reference class forecasting has been developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, it took almost 30 years to utilize the theory in a practical 
setting.44 Flyvbjerg et al. presented the first major study using RCF in 2004.45 
 
44 (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
45 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004) 
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The reference class for this study was established by considering all fields that were 
used in the investigation for the optimism and overconfidence bias. While the geological 
features might differ significantly within the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the projects are 
comparable in their fundamental nature. They are all producing from a well-known 
geological system, where ample data is available through historic projects. Further, the 
projects used for the reference class are all producing oil. Any fields not producing oil i.e. 
NGL, condensate and gas were omitted from this study at the beginning. 
Step 2 puts the production outcomes in a distributional setting so that information 
can be drawn from the probability distribution. One of the advantages of a continuous 
probability distribution is that we can draw any value of interest and compare it with the 
forecasted production. Details of step 2 are outlined below.  
 
RCF FOR FIELDS ON THE NCS 
Reference classes were established for each of the first eight production years. The 
first reference class contains first year production outcomes for all fields. The second 
reference class contains aggregated second year production outcomes for all fields, and so 
on. No fields were omitted from the study. With increasing production year, the size of the 
reference classes decreases, as some fields do not have eight years’ worth of production. 
Table 2 shows the number of fields included in each reference class.  
 
Production year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of fields included in RC 52 52 50 48 44 40 35 33 
Table 2. Number of fields included in each reference class 
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Similar to Chapter 5, the actual production outcomes for any aggregation year are 
normalized by the P50 forecasts (we are using the normalized P50s here, rather than the 
normalized means as it is more conclusive in this example). The normalized actual 
production values are sorted in ascending order by magnitude and analogous to Chapter 5, 
Keelin’s metalog distribution was used to fit a cumulative distribution to the normalized 
actual production data. Figure 18 shows the cumulative distribution for production year 3.  
 
After the cumulative distribution is fitted, the axes are switched and thus the 
distribution becomes inverted, shown in Figure 19. This will allow the determination of 
any multiplication factors.  
 





 Recall that the production outcomes were normalized by the P50. Any P50 forecast 
of any project at hand (for that specific aggregation year) can now be normalized (such that 
x=1.0) and be compared to the inverted distribution. The horizontal axis shows the 
acceptable probability of producing less than the forecasted value. The vertical axis in this 
context shows the RCF multipliers (i.e. multiplication factors, uplift factors). Therefore, 
for an unbiased P50 forecast the cumulative distribution would return a factor of 1.0 when 
looking at the 50% value on the horizontal axis. The plot for aggregation year 3 is again 
depicted in Figure 20 for better visualization.  
 
Figure 19. Inverted cumulative distribution for normalized aggregated production in year 3 
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If the P50 production forecast is optimistic the multiplication factor for the P50 
forecast will be less than 1. To account for the overconfidence bias, similar adjustments 
are expected for the 10th percentile. Figure 20 confirms that the multiplication factor for 
the biased P10 forecasts for aggregation year 3 are lower than 1. The RCF multipliers for 
the P10 and the P50 forecast are indicated in Figure 21, highlighted by the orange dotted 
lines.  
Figure 20. Acceptable chance of not attaining production and according RCF multiplier 
for aggregation year 3 
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RCF UPLIFTS FOR YEAR 1 TO YEAR 8 
Figure 22 and shows the P10 values both the biased and debiased forecasts, on an 
aggregated basis. The red dots indicate the probability of producing less than the biased 




Figure 21. Acceptable chance of not attaining production and respective RCF multiplier 
for aggregation year 3 with indicated P10 and P50 multipliers 
 50 
  The debiased forecasts were obtained by applying the aforementioned multipliers 
to the initial forecasts, and then determining the new probability of producing less than the 
forecasted production. An improvement is observable for the P10 forecasts, once the 
multiplication factors are applied. The quality of the forecasts improves, as the actual 
percentiles move closer to the values that would constitute an unbiased forecast.  
Figure 22. P10 percentiles before and after the application of RCF over the first 8 
production years 
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Figure 23 shows the P50 for both the biased and debiased forecasts, on an 
aggregated basis. The red dots indicate the probability of producing less than the biased 
P50 forecast. The green dots show the debiased forecasts.  
Again, an improvement is observable for the P50 forecasts, once the multiplication 
factors are applied. The quality of the forecasts improves, as the actual percentiles move 
closer to the values that would constitute an unbiased forecast.  
 
The multiplication factors are summarized in Table 3. The table also highlights one 
of the challenges encountered when using RCF. The number of available fields after year 
5 is reduced to the point where the obtained scaling factors for the P10 forecasts result in 
debiased P10 values close to or equal to zero. 
 
Figure 23. P50 percentiles before and after the application of RCF over the first 8 production 
years 
 52 
Year Without applying RCF multipliers With applying RCF multipliers 
 P10 P50 P90 P10 P50 P90 
1 0.59 0.63 0.41 0.13 0.44 0.87 
2 0.53 0.67 0.47 0.06 0.52 0.94 
3 0.51 0.66 0.49 0.09 0.46 0.91 
4 0.59 0.75 0.41 0.06 0.40 0.94 
5 0.58 0.70 0.42 0.04 0.43 0.96 
6 0.60 0.68 0.40 0 0.40 1 
7 0.56 0.63 0.44 0 0.40 1 
8 0.56 0.58 0.44 0.06 0.45 0.94 
Table 3. RCF multipliers for P10s and P50s for the first eight production years 
 
LIMITATIONS OF RCF  
There are several limitations pertaining to reference class forecasting.46 If the 
projects span over an extended time period, then the technology applied might differ 
significantly between individual projects. The uncertainty assessments may also differ 
substantially between individual fields. In the production forecasting context for fields on 
the NCS, those arguments do not hold true. It was already established that the increase in 
sophistications in uncertainty modeling does not in and itself lead to a reduction in the 
magnitude of biases.  
A second argument could be made about the class size. What is an appropriate size 
for a reference class, so that on the one hand, the projects are comparable but on the other 
 
46 (Hájek 2007), (Leleur et al. 2015) 
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hand the comparison is meaningful? It might be challenging to find a measure of 
comparison to quantify appropriate levels of similarities. In this study, given the limited 
amount of data, no samples were excluded from the reference class. Therefore, an 
inferential approach, to calculate the robustness of the reference class must be taken. To 
test the robustness of the class, a “one-out validation” was chosen. The following three 
steps were implemented. Aggregation year 3 was chosen to test the robustness:  
 
1.) Chose a random field from the reference class and exclude it from the class. 
2.) Recalculate a new reference class with the remaining fields. 
3.) Test if the new reference class would achieve the same or better results than the 
complete reference class, once the multipliers are utilized.  
 
The results of the one-out validation method are partly summarized in Table 4, the 
entire table can be found in Appendix A-5. Ten random fields have been chosen to show 
the results of the validity study. The P10 and the P50 corrected with the adjusted reference 
class shall be denoted as  
 
𝑃10𝑛−1 and 𝑃50𝑛−1 
 
Where n is the class size of the entire reference class. Table 4 shows that the P10 
forecasts on average were only slightly impacted by the removal one field from the 
reference class, indicating that the reference class in terms of determining the P10 scaling 
factors is robust. The P50 uplift factors in comparison seem to be moderately impacted by 
the removal of a single field. On average the removal of one field from the reference class 
resulted in a probability of 57% of producing less than the P50. For comparison, the entire 
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reference class will yield P50 forecasts that on average have a 46% probability of 
producing less than the forecasts. There is limited variation for the 𝑃10𝑛−1 and the 𝑃50𝑛−1 
for different 𝑛 − 1 reference classes. It can therefore be concluded, that the reference class 
is robust and large enough in size.  
 
Field number P10n-1 P50n-1 avg. P10n avg. P50n 
30 0.104 0.583 0.090 0.460 
47 0.104 0.604 0.090 0.460 
3 0.104 0.542 0.090 0.460 
35 0.104 0.583 0.090 0.460 
14 0.083 0.563 0.090 0.460 
39 0.104 0.604 0.090 0.460 
12 0.083 0.563 0.090 0.460 
42 0.104 0.604 0.090 0.460 
37 0.104 0.604 0.090 0.460 
Table 4. 10 randomly excluded fields with unbiased forecasts for the entire dataset 
excluding that specific field 
If the reference class would be sensible to the exclusion of one field, the reference 
class could be refined pertaining geological characteristics. Unfortunately, the geological 
data of each field are not available for this study. Another refinement to RCF in a 
production forecasting context could be the distinction regarding field size. However, as 
pointed out previously, for this specific case field size does not seem to significantly impact 
the magnitude of biases.  
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8. Rho Signal Information System 
 
REFERENCE CLASS COMBINED FRAMEWORKS – LITERATURE  
The application of RCF to oil and gas production can be considered a brute force 
method. The convenience regarding calculations and utilization is contrasted by the 
uncertainty whether the class is representative and thus applicable to the project at hand. 
The second approach, presented in this chapter, is based on Bayesian probability theory. A 
Bayesian framework will be used, in which historic data is used as a prior and the 
distributional forecast is used as a likelihood. Those two distributions will be used to 
calculate a posterior probability distribution. Previous research has produced a variety of 
different approaches to build such a model. 
Bordley published a study in 2014, in which a Bayesian framework was utilized by 
combining statistical modeling and past outcomes (reference class).47 A posterior 
probability was calculated by updating the reference class data with the statistical model. 
The study investigated the predicted healthcare cost under a voluntary employee benefit 
association and showed that the resulting posterior probability had a greater variance and 
a larger mean than the model-based approach, thus mitigating the biases of the original cost 
forecasts. While this might work well for cases with access to the model on which the 
forecasts are based on, it is not applicable in the existing case. The model(s) used for the 
production forecasts was (were) not made available for this study.  
A similar approach to Bordley can be found in a study published by Leleur et al. in 
2015, in which RCF is combined with expert judgement pertaining the uncertainty 
 
47 (Bordley 2014) 
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ranges.48 Similarly, Leleur et al. found an improvement in the calibration of forecasts once 
RCF is applied. The use of expert judgement resulted in scaling factors that are either 
greater or smaller than 1, thus increasing or decreasing the uncertainty range for the 
reference class. The authors suggest that if the use of expert judgement yields a scaling 
factor greater than one, the uncertainty of the reference class is adjusted, taking into account 
higher uncertainty implied by the expert judgement. If the opposite case is present, and a 
scaling factor of less than one is obtained from expert judgement, the authors suggest using 
the uncertainty range specified by the original reference class.  
 
RHO SIGNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM - APPLICATION 
Therefore, the attention should be shifted to a model that will integrate the reference 
class data with the probability distribution over the forecasted production. A Bayesian 
framework, where the reference class information is used to define the prior and the 
forecasted production (likelihood function) is used as a signal to calculate the posterior 
probability distribution parameter, will be specified. The term rho signal information 
system (RSIS) was first coined in 2008 in a value-of-information focused paper by Eric 
Bickel.49 As part of this study, the value was determined for which the value of an 
information system correlated with a normally distributed signal, using 𝜌, is equal to 
𝜌 × 100% the value of perfect information. A similar approach is taking to develop the 
RSIS for the present data. 
 
48 (Leleur et al. 2015) 
49 (Bickel 2008) 
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The assumption is made that the logarithm of the reference class data and the 
production forecasts are distributed according to a bivariant Gaussian distribution. The 
approach to creating such a model is detailed in the following steps:  
 
1.) The reference class consists of the actual outcomes for all fields that had valid P10, 
mean and P90 production forecasts. A maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used to 
find the parameters of the probability distribution that best fits the reference class data. The 
MLE is used to find the best estimate for the parameter values that will maximize the 
likelihood function that most closely approximates the observed data. The parameter values 
of the MLE are called maximum likelihood estimators. In this particular case, the desired 
probability distribution over the reference class data is a lognormal distribution. The 
detailed derivation of the maximum likelihood parameters for a lognormal distribution can 
be found in Appendix-A2. The resulting maximum likelihood estimators (mean and 





















Using the MLEs we were able to fit a lognormal distribution to the actual production 
outcomes. The lognormal distribution was then transformed into a normal distribution 
(Figure 24), in order to use properties of bivariant Gaussian distribution, which will become 
apparent in the next steps.  
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The following equations were used to transform the mean (𝑚) and variance (𝑣) of a 



















Figure 24. Reference class distribution in normal space 
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2.) In step 2, a Pearson correlation coefficient 𝜌 is used, to correlate the mean forecasts 
with the actual outcomes. For a pair of random variables X and Y, the correlation 







The covariance is defined as follows:  
 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌) = Ε[(𝑋 − Ε[𝑋])(𝑌 − Ε[𝑌]] = Ε[𝑋𝑌] − Ε[𝑋]Ε[𝑌] 
 
With E being the expected value. The rho between the forecasted mean and the actual 
production for this data set is 0.83. 
 
3.) The fitted lognormal distributions from chapter 4 were converted into normal 
distributions, using the same equations as in step 1. The forecast will be the likelihood 
function (i.e. the signal) in the Bayesian framework. 
 
4.) Next, an appropriate value from the production forecast distribution must be chosen 
to update the prior reference class and thus obtain the posterior probability. As stated 
previously, it is assumed that most of the time and effort will go into determining the 
expected production forecast, thus the mean was chosen as a representative value from the 
probability distribution.   
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5.) In the final step, the posterior probability must be calculated. The variance of the 
likelihood function in the RSIS is fixed and known, with the mean becoming the model 
parameter. Given that the prior and likelihood are Gaussian distributed, we can infer that 
the posterior will also be Gaussian distributed (bivariate Gaussian distribution - see Figure 




2 = (1 − 𝜌2)𝜎0
2 
 





Figure 25. Schematic illustration of a bivariate Gaussian distribution (green). 
Matlab code provided by Bscan (2019).  
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RESULTS OF RSIS  
Figure 26 shows the rho signal information system results for a randomly chosen 
field and year.  
 
The prior (RCF) is shown in blue, the signal (production forecast) is depicted in red 
and the adjusted production forecast (posterior) is shown in green. Recall that all 
distributions are depicted in normal space. The mean of the posterior is lower than the mean 
of the likelihood distribution, but higher than the mean of the prior distribution. This is a 
result that is expected. The RCF would likely underestimate the mean production but the 
signal and likelihood are used to update the prior beliefs and will result in a mean that is 
between the historic data of actual production and the production forecast generated for 
Figure 26. Rho-information system for a random field and a random production year 
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that field and year. The variance of the production forecast is considerably smaller than the 
variance of the reference class, resulting in a narrower distribution for the likelihood 
function. The reference class provides a wider distribution, based on historic outcomes 
which will also increase the variance of the posterior distribution. This correction will 
mitigate the effects associated with the overconfidence bias. Hence in a Bayesian updated 
forecast, we see that historic past data can be used to adjust a biased production forecast. 
 
Similar to RCF, a sensitivity analysis pertaining the first eight production years was 
conducted. Figure 27 depicts the probability of exceeding the production forecasts, before 
and after application of the rho signal information system, on an individual basis. 
Production years for the rho signal information system were investigated on an individual 
basis, rather than an aggregated basis (like in the RCF chapter) because a single distribution 
representing all production years was used as a prior. Thus, adding up variances as 
suggested previously to determine aggregated production forecasts would yield results that 





A quick view reveals that the adjusted percentiles are more accurate for the P10 
values, but the P50 forecasts only improve marginally. The first two production years 
deviate more significantly from the actual percentiles, even after the rho signal correction. 
Given the possible negative implications of overconfidence on NPV, the rho signal 
information system application is worthwhile.  
 
LIMITATIONS  
There are several limitations that arise when the rho signal information system is 
used. Keeping the variance of the prior fixed will result in a posterior distribution with a 
constant variance. In a practical setting it is expected that the variance for various fields 
differ. However, RSIS in this chapter was used to mainly illustrate that a Bayesian 
framework, where historic data is used to update the production forecast, can be used to 
adjust biased estimates. If a Bayesian framework is used to update the forecasts in future 
Figure 27. P10 and P50 percentile before and after the application of the rho signal 
information system for the first 8 production years, on an individual basis 
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work, more sophisticated models such as the Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach or the 
Normal-Gamma conjugate pair would likely yield better results.  
Another limitation arises from the constraints faced when choosing an appropriate 
value from the likelihood distribution. While it is sensible to choose the mean, a different 
value will yield different posterior distributions. Picking the mean or mode will give 
disproportional weight to those values. One potential approach to overcome this limitation 
would be a sequential use of the P10, mean and P90, where these three values are used as 
three signals to determine the posterior.   
 65 
9. Discussion on limitation and next steps  
Despite having access to almost 600 years’ worth of forecasts and actual production 
data from 55, limitations still arise. First, the data is reported annually, which is especially 
detrimental for the initial production data. Without more detailed production data (i.e. 
monthly) it will be impossible to further refine the impact of the start-up delays on the 
production in the first year. Despite this limitation, the analysis based on the annual data 
provide valuable information regarding the quality of probabilistic production forecasts for 
oil fields on the NCS. 
As briefly alluded to earlier, the reference class should be refined to get more 
conclusive results from the reference class. Some of the characteristics, which might 
provide feasible class selection criteria are geological settings, field size, applied 
technology etc. Without any additional data for the fields investigated in this study it will 
be difficult to refine the reference class.  
Finally, the application of any model should naturally always be scrutinized in 
terms of its consistency with data at hand and rationale with regard to constraints. A good 
starting point is the recommendation made by Leleur regarding expert judgements. Picking 
the results with a wider uncertainty range, whether it is based on historic data or expert 
judgement, will yield better results on average. Given strong evidence of overconfident 
production forecasts, this argument also seems logically sound for this study.  
There are several steps that can be taken beyond what was covered in this thesis. 
The utilization of a database that keeps track of past forecasting performance and allows 
for easy access to data for any reference class seems imperative. It is assumed that most 
operators do have such a database, yet what remains uncertain is to what extend operators 
draw on past experiences to produce production forecasts. With ample evidence of past 
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forecasting studies from different disciplines, that keeping track is beneficial, the creation 
and appropriate utilization of such a database is strongly advised.  
Lastly, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is unique in its approach to improve 
transparency in the industry. More government agencies should advocate public 
accessibility to data to improve the industries understanding of this problem. Individually, 
operators may not always be aware that production shortfalls suffer from suffer biases 
rather than “unexpected events”. 
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10. Summary and conclusions  
Production forecasts for oil fields on the NCS, approved between 1995 and 2017, 
are biased. The analysis demonstrates clear evidence of optimism and overconfidence. The 
mean forecasts are, on average higher than the actual production, i.e. they are optimistic. 
The P10 (and P90) forecasts bound an uncertainty range, in which less than 80% of the 
actual production falls, i.e. they are overconfident. The causes commonly presented to 
justify production shortfalls might be numerous, but the real causes are traceable to biases. 
There are generally two categories of biases that are predominant. Intentional biases 
(deception) and unintentional biases (delusion) can both lead to value destruction.  
The biases vary depending on the production year. Given that the first reinvestment 
occurred in year 8, most of the analyses focus on the first eight production years. CDF plots 
are generated to quantify the impact of those biases. 
There is a number of mitigation and correction processes that can aid in debiasing 
the forecasts. Reference class forecasting is a tool that puts past projects in a distributional 
setting and lets the forecaster determine uplift or scaling factor to the project at hand. It is 
a convenient and fast method that allows for convenient use. The results show significant 
improvement in the production forecasts when compared to the biased, uncorrected 
production forecasts. The rho signal information system is a more sophisticated model, 
compared to the RCF, with the latter considered as somewhat of a “brute force method”. 
In the rho signal information system, a Bayesian framework is used to update the prior 
probability distribution with the production forecasts. This framework can also be 
considered as a more wholesome approach, since it will honor all inputs provided by the 
experts to determine the production forecasts.  
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As shown by various studies, the financial impact of these biases can be substantial. 
The biases could, for example, lead to a project being approved when it would not have 
been approved, if the forecasts were unbiased. Moreover, even when the same projects 
would be approved, the concept choices would likely be different given unbiased forecasts. 
The reduction of biases in production forecasts is of importance since the NPV can be 
reduced by the aforementioned biases. 
Based on the widespread biases encountered in the industry, it is best to echo what 
Welsh and Begg have already stated in earlier work: “In fact, in light of what we know 
about how bias affects decision making and the economic impacts of this, it could 
reasonably be claimed that debiasing of [oil and gas] industry decisions has greater 
potential to improve economic outcomes than time and money put into honing 
technological and modelling processes.”50   
  
 
50 (Welsh and Begg 2015) 
 69 
11. Appendix A  
A-1. ALTERNATE LOGNORMAL FITTING METHOD  
A log-normal fit can also be obtained using the forecasted P10 and P90 values as 
followed. Setting up the following equations, with known 𝑧1, 𝑧2 values for 𝛼1,𝛼2 
percentiles, will give  
 
ln(𝑧𝑖) = 𝜇 + 𝜎Φ
−1(𝛼𝑖). 
 
Combining the information from the two percentiles yields  
 
𝜎 =







−1(𝛼2) − ln (𝑧2)Φ
−1(𝛼1)
Φ−1(𝛼2) −  Φ−1(𝛼1)
. 
𝜇 can also be calculated directly, once 𝜎 is obtained, as 𝜇 is a function of 𝜎 and can 
be calculated using either of the original equation presented in Appendix A-1, i.e., 
 
𝜇 = ln(𝑚) − 𝜎2 2⁄ . 
 
A-2. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION51 
A lognormal distribution was chosen to be fit to the reference class data with the 








]                       𝑋 > 0,−∞ < 𝜇 < ∞, 𝜎 > 0  
 
In order to compute the maximum likelihood estimators of the two-parameter 
lognormal distribution, the likelihood function needs to be established first.  
 
51 (Ginos 2009) 
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With the log-likelihood function being:  
 













































































In order to find the maximum likelihood estimators, the two 
parameters ?̂? and ?̂?  need to be determined, such that the equation 
ℒ(𝜇, 𝜎2|𝑋) is maximized. This is achieved by taking the gradient of ℒ with 



















































































A-3. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION (POSTERIOR PROBABILITY) OF A BIVARIANT NORMAL 
DISTRIBUTION WITH MULTIPLE OBSERVATIONS52 
The derivation of the posterior probability for a multivariant gaussian is shown in 
the normal space. For a lognormal distribution the steps are the same, with the only 
difference that the data is exponentiated. 
 






2 being the prior hyperparameters. Given multiple independent 















































Since the product of two Gaussian is a Gaussian 
 

























































































































































   
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→       𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝜌𝑥,𝑦𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑦 
Thus, the variance and mean expressed with 𝜌 becomes 
 
𝜎𝑛
2 = (1 − 𝜌2)𝜎0
2 
 




A-5. VALIDITY RESULTS FOR REFERENCE CLASS 
Table of uplift factors for the “leave-one-out” process to test the robustness of the 
reference class in chapter 7.  
 
Field P10 P50 
28 0.104 0.563 
30 0.104 0.583 
32 0.104 0.583 
31 0.104 0.583 
7 0.083 0.542 
33 0.104 0.583 
39 0.104 0.604 
20 0.083 0.563 
6 0.083 0.542 
16 0.083 0.563 
36 0.104 0.604 
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43 0.104 0.604 
10 0.083 0.563 
8 0.083 0.563 
0 0.104 0.563 
5 0.083 0.542 
1 0.104 0.542 
47 0.104 0.604 
17 0.083 0.563 
34 0.104 0.583 
44 0.104 0.604 
45 0.104 0.604 
37 0.104 0.604 
22 0.104 0.563 
21 0.104 0.563 
11 0.083 0.563 
12 0.083 0.563 
14 0.083 0.563 
25 0.104 0.563 
19 0.083 0.563 
38 0.104 0.604 
18 0.083 0.563 
27 0.104 0.563 
2 0.104 0.542 
41 0.104 0.604 
48 0.104 0.604 
42 0.104 0.604 
9 0.083 0.563 
23 0.104 0.563 
35 0.104 0.583 
15 0.083 0.563 
40 0.104 0.604 
26 0.104 0.563 
24 0.104 0.563 
29 0.104 0.583 
3 0.104 0.542 
13 0.083 0.563 
46 0.104 0.604 
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